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We investigate what determines the maturity of loans to small, informationally 
opaque businesses. We find that longer maturities are associated with collateral 
pledges,  better  financial  condition,  good  credit  history,  and  less  informational 
opacity of the borrower. However, we do not find a positive association between 
stronger  firm-creditor  relationships  (which  can  attenuate  these  information 
asymmetries)  and  longer  maturities.  The  evidence  suggests  that  creditors  use 
shorter maturities to induce more frequent renegotiation of contract terms, thus 
enforcing closer monitoring of more informationally opaque and risky borrowers. 
Overall,  our  results  are  consistent  with  shorter  loan  maturities  mitigating  the 
consequences of borrower-lender informational asymmetries.   1
1. Introduction 
Private debt markets that provide funds for small businesses are characterized by 
information  and  agency  problems  that  arise  from  the  opacity  that  is  typical  of  these 
businesses. Financial intermediaries make credit decisions and design loan contract terms 
on the basis of the firm’s financial condition, credit history, the characteristics of the 
entrepreneur,  and  the  severity  of  the  associated  information  problems.  While  recent 
research  on  credit  availability,  credit  limits,  credit  constraints,  borrowing  costs,  and 
collateral  requirements  provides  many  insights  about  small  business  finance,  the 
determinants of loan maturity remain largely unexplored.  
We  use  the  1993  National  Survey  of  Small  Businesses  Finances  (NSSBF)  to 
investigate  how  financial  intermediaries  determine  the  maturity  of  loans  to  small 
businesses. We hypothesize that lenders use loan maturity to address information and 
control problems that arise in small business lending. Specifically, we argue that detailed 
debt covenants that could reduce moral hazard problems are very costly to write and 
enforce  for  such  small,  informationally  opaque  businesses.  In  this  context,  financial 
institutions could use shorter term loan contracts to force more frequent renegotiation, 
gaining flexibility and control when lending to small firms. Thus, we expect that less 
risky and more informationally transparent firms obtain loans with longer maturities. 
Our empirical tests are based on the premises that longer maturities exacerbate the 
consequences of borrower-lender informational asymmetries (e.g., borrowers are more 
able to shift risk, or more likely to be in financial distress at the time of repayment) and 
that lenders have strong bargaining power over the loan contract terms. We empirically 
examine  the  association  between  loan  maturity  and  proxies  for  publicly  available   2
information/firm’s reputation, firm and owner credit history, indicators of firms’ financial 
health,  owner  characteristics,  governance  structure,  collateral  pledges,  and  the  use  of 
personal  or  third  party  guarantees.  In  addition,  to  the  extent  that  strong  firm-creditor 
relationships generate information about borrowers and attenuate information problems, 
we also explore whether lenders lengthen maturities to borrowers with whom they have 
closer  ties.  Our  empirical  analysis  also  distinguishes  lines  of  credit  from  other  loans 
types, such as capital leases, mortgages, motor vehicle loans, and equipment loans. Lines 
of credit are arguably more relationship-driven than other loan types (Berger and Udell 
(1995), Harhoff and Körting (1998)). Thus, any effect of relationships on loan maturity 
can  be  stronger  for  lines  of  credit.  On  the  other  hand,  other  loan  types  have  longer 
maturities than lines of credit and tend to be fully collateralized, suggesting that loan 
maturities may be driven by different factors. 
Theoretical  research  on  debt  covenants  suggests  that  the  strictest  terms  are 
generally  imposed  on  the  firms  with  the  most  credit  risk  and  greatest  moral  hazard 
incentives (Berlin and Loeys (1988); Berlin and Mester (1993)). Debt contracts for larger 
firms  generally  contain  detailed  covenants,  requiring  the  borrower  to  return  to  the 
institution to renegotiate these covenants when strategic opportunities arise or when the 
financial condition of the firm changes (Smith and Warner (1979)). These covenants give 
the lending institution control over borrowers. In addition, Berlin and Mester (1993) and 
Park (2002) show that by giving banks the right to renegotiate or call loans if covenants 
are violated, covenants enhance the flexibility and efficiency of financial contracting. 
However, small firms such as those surveyed in the NSSBF typically do not have audited 
financial statements, and thus formal debt covenants linked to financial ratios and the   3
periodic submission of financial information are costly to write and enforce. In such a 
context, the literature on debt covenants suggests that lenders have a strong influence on 
debt maturity, and that they may use shorter-term loan contracts to force more frequent 
renegotiation and mitigate the problems arising from the informational opacity and risk of 
small  firms.  Our  main  goal  is  to  explore  whether  observed  loan  maturities  could  be 
explained by this debt covenant view. 
Observed debt maturities are the result of a bargaining process between lenders 
and borrowers. We argue that the debt covenant view is more appropriate to interpret the 
results in our sample of small firms, where lenders have strong bargaining power, and are 
therefore  more  likely  to  use  maturity  as  an  instrument  to  exert  control  over 
informationally opaque borrowers. However, in direct contrast with the debt covenant 
view,  theoretical  research  relating  asymmetric  information  and  debt  maturity  largely 
assumes that maturity is determined by borrowers with private information about their 
quality, either to signal their type to lenders or to minimize the effect of their private 
information on borrowing costs (e.g., Flannery (1986), Kale and Noe (1990), Diamond 
(1991))
1. However, these theories largely relate to public debt in large corporations, and 
thus are not well suited to explain debt maturity for small businesses (see Ravid (1996) 
for a survey of this literature). Our sample of small private firms is more appropriate to 
examine  the  debt  covenant  view  of  debt  maturity,  as  we  believe  that  for  such  firms 
observed maturities are primarily driven by lenders’ concerns about borrower control. 
                                                 
1  In  Diamond  (1991)  some  very  low  rated  borrowers  are  forced  to  borrow  short-term  because  of  the 
extreme adverse selection costs of long-term debt. In this sense, this prediction is similar to that in the debt 
covenant view.   4
Moreover, our sample consists of bank loans, and we exclude issues of notes or bonds, 
where firms may be more able to influence maturity. 
Previous  studies  on  debt  maturity  have  followed  two  different  methodological 
approaches. The balance sheet approach examines the maturity structure of total debt 
outstanding at a point in time. The incremental approach focuses on the maturity of new 
debt issues. We take the latter approach, which is better suited to test the hypothesis that 
lenders shorten maturities to more informationally opaque and risky borrowers, because 
lenders have direct control over the maturity of new loans, but not over the maturity 
structure  of  a  firm’s  total  liabilities.  There  are  also  practical  reasons  in  favor  of  the 
incremental approach. We can use precise measures of maturity, rather than relying on 
imperfect measures such as the fraction of total debt that is long-term. It also allows us to 
examine what determines maturity as a function of firm characteristics at the time the 
loan was negotiated. Finally, we can use detailed information about the other contract 
terms (such as collateral pledges, guarantees, interest rate, loan amounts, fixed rates, etc.) 
to control for other factors that affect observed maturities.  
Our results show that firms that pledge collateral obtain longer maturity lines of 
credit. This is consistent with collateral mitigating borrower risk-shifting incentives and 
lenders’ concern about the higher probability of default associated with longer maturities. 
However, we find no statistically significant effect of guarantees. One explanation for 
this finding is that a guarantee is a weaker claim than a pledge of collateral, since it does 
not involve specific liens that prevent these assets from being sold or consumed. For 
other loans, which tend to be fully collateralized, we find no evidence that guarantees are 
associated  with  longer  maturity  loans.  We  also  find  that  larger  firms  obtain  longer   5
maturity  loans  across  all  loan  types,  and  that  firm  age  is  positively  associated  with 
maturity for lines of credit. To the extent that firm size and age are inverse proxies for 
informational opacity, this evidence is consistent with financial intermediaries shortening 
loan maturity to more informationally opaque borrowers. Firm owners that have been 
delinquent  on  personal  obligations  are  granted  lines  of  credit  with  shorter  maturities, 
providing evidence that banks force more frequent renegotiation when lending to more 
risky borrowers. For loans other than lines of credit, we find that more profitable firms 
obtain longer maturity loans. In addition, the length of the commitment is negatively 
related to the principal owner’s age for all loan types, while it is also positively related to 
owner experience in the sub-sample of other loans. Taken together, these results provide 
strong evidence of the role of maturity in addressing information and control problems.  
Our analysis uses three different proxies for the strength of the relationships: its 
length, borrowing concentration (our proxy is the number of institutions from which the 
firm borrows), and the scope, that is, the use of other informationally intensive financial 
services  from  the  lender  (e.g.,  checking  and  savings  accounts).  Contrary  to  our 
expectations  we  find  that  stronger  or  broader  borrower-lender  relationships  are  not 
associated  with  longer  maturity  loans.  In  particular,  we  find  no  effect  of  longer 
relationships  or  more  concentrated  borrowings  on  loan  maturity  for  any  loan  type. 
Furthermore, checking accounts with the lender are associated with shorter maturities in 
the  sample  of  other  loans,  while  other  financial  services  with  the  lender  (such  as 
transaction,  cash  management,  credit  related,  brokerage,  or  trust  services)  are  weakly 
related to shorter maturities for lines of credit.   6
Our  paper  contributes  to  the  growing  literature  on  small  business  finance  by 
exploring  the  determinants  of  loan  maturity.  We  are  aware  of  only  two  studies  that 
examine debt maturity for small businesses. Scherr and Hulburt (2001) use the NSSBF to 
examine debt maturity structure using the balance sheet approach. Their debt maturity 
structure measures include the fraction of total debt outstanding that matures in one year 
or more, and the weighted average maturity of all of the firms’ debt. However, while their 
results  are  consistent  with  Diamond’s  (1991)  model,  they  don’t  find  statistically 
significant  effects  of  their  proxies  for  informational  asymmetry  on  debt  maturity 
structure. Our paper differs from theirs in that we focus on the maturity of new loans, as 
opposed to the composition of total debt, which reflects a firm’s past financing decisions. 
Contrary to their results, our more detailed tests suggest a strong connection between 
information  asymmetry  and  debt  maturity.  Berger,  Espinosa-Vega,  Frame,  and  Miller 
(2003) also use data on loans to small businesses to examine loan maturities. However 
they focus more on how firms determine the maturity of the loan, and therefore test the 
predictions in Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991). Their results are consistent with 
both  theoretical  models  for  low-risk  borrowers,  but  conflict  with  the  predictions  in 
Diamond’s model for high-risk borrowers.  
Recent  work  examines  how  large,  publicly  traded  firms  choose  debt  maturity 
(e.g., Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996), Mitchell (1991), Guedes and 
Opler (1996), Dennis, Nandy and Sharpe (2000)). We add to this literature by exploring 
what determines the debt maturity in small, private firms, where information problems 
are more likely to be severe. We differ from studies on large firms in that our results are   7
more  easily  interpreted  within  the  debt  covenant  view  of  maturity,  as  lenders  in  our 
sample have strong bargaining power to influence debt maturity.  
Our paper also contributes to the relationship lending literature by studying the 
effect of relationships on the maturity of the loan contract. Previous empirical evidence 
points to a significant effect of stronger firm-creditor relationships on credit availability 
and collateral requirements (Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995), Cole (1998), Berger and 
Udell (1995), Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000), Angelini, Di Salvo, and Ferri (1998)). 
However the effect of relationship variables on borrowing costs is mixed, and therefore 
not conclusive. While Berger and Udell (1995) focus on bank lines of credit and find that 
borrowers with longer relationships pay lower interest rates, Petersen and Rajan (1994), 
and Angelini, Di Salvo, and Ferri (1998), find that no significant effect on the price of 
credit. Degryse and Cayseele (2000) find that the loan rate increases with the duration of 
the relationship but decreases in the scope of the relationship. Our results suggest that the 
strength of the relationship has no effect in the determination of the maturity of the loan. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data set and the variables used in 
the analysis, section 3 presents the empirical tests and results, and section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The data and variable selection 
Our  data  source  is  the  1993  National  Survey  of  Small  Business  Finances 
(NSSBF),  which  was  conducted  during  1994-95.  This  survey  is  representative  of  4.9 
million  small  businesses  in  the  U.S.  with  fewer  than  500  employees  that  were  in 
operation  as  of  year-end  1992.  The  survey  contains  detailed  data  about  the  contract 
features  of  the  most  recent  loan  obtained  by  the  firm,  an  inventory  of  firm’s  use  of   8
financial services, recent credit history of the firm and its owners, specific information 
about the owners, firm’s income statement and balance sheet data
2. The survey’s focus on 
small firms is ideal for our purposes. Given that many of the firms in our sample do not 
have  formal  financial  statements,  information  problems  are  likely  to  be  severe.  This 
allows us to examine the maturity of loan contracts in a context in which this contract 
feature could serve as an instrument to address information problems.  
The original 1993 SSBF contains data on 1,695 loans. We drop 3 observations 
with zero sales, 7 where the reported interest rate on the loan is zero, and 13 with missing 
data for relevant variables
3. Thus, our sample consists of 1,672 loans to small businesses 
granted during 1990-94. Table 1 shows the composition of our sample, broken down by 
industry, organizational form, type of lender, year of application, and the stated use of the 
funds. 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
The firms in our sample represent a variety of industries. While firms have different 
organizational  forms,  a  majority  of  them  are  corporations  (72%).  Most  loans  were 
granted by banking institutions, defined to comprise credit unions, savings banks, savings 
and loans associations, and commercial banks. In addition, a vast majority of the loans in 
the  sample  were  granted  during  1993-1994,  while  roughly  half  of  the  loans  were 
requested for working capital. 
                                                 
2 For more details about the 1993 NSSBF see Cole and Wolken (1995). 
3 These are 11 observations where the length of the relationship with the lender was missing, and two for 
which information about the concentration of deposits in the lender’s area was missing.   9
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the loan contract features for the different 
loan types. The median loan maturity in our sample is 12 months, ranging from one 
month to 30 years. The median amount borrowed is $100 thousands, while 72% of the 
loans are collateralized and 56% have a guarantor. The median interest rate charged is 
8%, and 41% of the loans have fixed rates. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
Almost 60% of the loans are lines of credit
4. The contract terms differ markedly 
according to the loan type. Lines of credit have shorter maturities than other loan types.  
The amount borrowed using lines of credit is close to four times the amounts borrowed in 
other types of loans, except for mortgages that have similar amounts. Around 62% of the 
lines of credit are secured, while other loans tend to be fully collateralized, except for the 
other miscellaneous loans. Fixed-rate loans are less common for lines of credit than for 
other loan types. Median interest rates charged are not significantly different across loan 
types, although they tend to be lower for lines of credit
5.  
Table 3 describes the variables used in the regression analysis of loan maturity, 
broken down into loan contract terms, informational opacity variables, financial condition 
variables,  firm  and  owner  credit  history  variables,  ownership/governance  variables, 
relationship variables, and other control variables. Among the contract characteristics, 
                                                 
4 A line of credit allows a business customer to borrow up to a prespecified limit, repay all or a portion of 
the borrowing and reborrow as necessary until the credit line matures.  
5 This could be due to the existence of other price terms for lines of credit, specifically fees against the total 
amount committed, against the unused portion, or both.    10
Maturity is the length of the contract term in months; Collateral is a dummy variable 
indicating  whether  the  loan  was  secured;  Guarantor  is  a  dummy  variable  indicating 
whether the loan was guaranteed; Interest is the interest rate paid on the loan; Relamount 
is the amount of the loan divided by total assets; Fixedrate is a dummy equal to one if the 
interest rate on the loan is fixed, and zero if it is floating.  
Other  contract  terms  interact  with  maturity  choices.  Of  particular  interest  in 
exploring the use of loan maturity in addressing information problems and controlling 
risky borrowers is the role of collateral pledges and guarantees, as both of these features 
make a loan safer for the lender.  It is important to note that guarantees provide less 
protection to the lender than guarantees. While collateral pledges involve specific assets 
(collateral is generally provided in the form of equipment, real estate, personal assets of 
the owner, inventory or accounts receivable), guarantees give the lender recourse against 
the firm’s owners for any deficiency in payment, but do not involve any specific liens. 
Thus, while we expect a positive association between Collateral and Guarantor and loan 
maturity, we conjecture that the effect of the former should be stronger. Finally, we do 
not  have  a  prediction  for  the  effect  of  Relamount.  On  the  one  hand,  an  increase  in 
leverage makes the loan riskier to the lender, and so should lead to shorter maturities. On 
the other hand, larger loans typically finance longer horizon activities, and so should be 
associated with longer maturities. 
 
Insert table 3 here 
   11
We use two inverse proxies for informational opacity: Firmsize, which is firm 
size measured by the value of its assets, and Firmage, the age of the firm measured in 
years.  As Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001) suggest, borrower size is an inverse measure 
of informational opacity because smaller firms typically have less informative financial 
statements, less experience, and lower public profiles. Also, as more public information is 
available to investors for older firms, firm age reflects information that becomes available 
to the market as a whole (a firm’s public reputation). Thus, firm age also serves as an 
inverse  proxy  for  informational  opacity.  To  the  extent  that  these  variables  are  good 
proxies for firm informational opacity, we expect a Firmsize and Firmage to be positively 
associated with loan maturity.  
Our firm financial condition variables are Dta, the debt-to-assets ratio, Roa, the 
return on assets, and NWC, current assets minus current liabilities divided by total assets. 
To  capture  the  credit  history  of  the  firm  and  the  primary  owner,  we  code  dummy 
variables for whether the firm’s primary owner was delinquent on personal obligations in 
the last 3 years (Owdelinq), the firm was delinquent on business obligations in the last 3 
years (Firmdelinq), the firm declared bankruptcy during the 7 years preceding the loan 
application (Bankrupt), or there are any judgments rendered against the firm’s principal 
owner (Judgment). Thus, if lenders use shorter loan maturities to exert control of more 
risky borrowers, we expect stronger financial conditions and better credit histories to be 
associated with longer maturities.  
Different  ownership  structures  may  be  related  to  the  amount  of  private 
information borrowers have, the risks borrowers take, and their ability to shift risk to the 
lenders. All of these factors are important in the determination of contract characteristics,   12
and could therefore have a direct  effect on loan maturity. To control for  governance 
characteristics, we include the variable Ownmg, which indicates whether the principal 
owner manages the firm, Ownshr, the fractional ownership of the principal owner, and 
Family,  which  indicates  whether  a  single  family  owns  at  least  50%  of  firm.  These 
variables could be important if owner-managers have different incentives than employee-
managers regarding risk choices, or if higher ownership or family control induces better 
monitoring. We also include the age of the principal owner, Ownage, and his or her 
experience, Exper, both in years. Both of these factors are related to firm governance, and 
can affect loan maturity. In addition, our regressions control for the legal form of the firm 
by including four dummy variables indicating whether the firm is a sole proprietorship, a 
partnership,  a  subchapter  S  corporation,  or  a  non-Subchapter  S  corporation.  Sole 
proprietorships are the omitted category in all our regressions. 
We follow the relationship lending literature in capturing the strength of firm-
creditor relationships using the length of the relationship and borrowing concentration.  
Length is the length of the relationship with the lender in years, and Multiple is a dummy 
variable indicating whether the borrower has loans from more than one institution. In 
addition, to capture the scope of the relationships, we include dummy variables indicating 
whether  the  borrower  uses  informationally  intensive  financial  services  at  the  lending 
institution.  Checking, Savings, and Othfinserv indicate whether the firm uses a checking 
account, a savings account, or other financial services from the lending institution (such 
as  transaction  services,  cash  management  services,  credit-related  services,  brokerage 
services, or trust services).  If lenders obtain valuable information about the borrower 
during  their  ongoing  relationships,  they  will  use  this  information  to  better  assess  the   13
borrower’s risk and adjust the terms of the loan contract. We therefore expect a positive 
association between Length and maturity. Under the assumption that more concentrated 
borrowing generates more/better information for the lender, firms with more concentrated 
borrowing should be able to borrow longer term. Thus, we expect a negative effect of 
Multiple  on  maturity.  Alternatively,  Multiple  might  really  be  a  proxy  of  the  firm’s 
quality.  Lower  quality  firms  could  be  credit  constrained  at  their  primary  lender,  and 
therefore  must  seek  additional  financing  in  other  institutions.  Thus,  Multiple  might 
simply be a proxy for the firm’s riskiness or credit quality. The use of financial services 
at the lending institution might also provide the lender with valuable information about 
the  borrower’s  quality.  We  therefore  expect  a  positive  relation  between  maturity  and 
Checking, Savings and Othfinserv.  
We also control for other factors that can affect loan maturity. As there is some 
time variation in our sample, we include the variable Termstruct defined as the difference 
between the yield of a 10-year government bond and the yield of a 3-month Treasury bill 
at the time the loan was made. We include this variable because the term structure of 
interest rates could affect loan maturity for tax reasons (Brick and Ravid (1985)). We also 
use a dummy variable that indicates whether the lender operates in a market where the 
Herfindhal-Hirschman index of bank deposits concentration is above 1800 (Highconc). 
This variable attempts to control for any possible effects of credit market competition on 
loan maturity. We also code three dummy variables to control for differences in lending 
practices across different types of lenders. Bank indicates whether the lender is a bank, 
defined to comprise Credit Unions, Savings Banks, Savings and Loan Associations, and 
Commercial  Banks;  Nonbank  identifies  non-bank  financial  institutions,  which  include   14
Finance  Companies,  Insurance  Companies,  Brokerage  or  Mutual  Fund  Companies, 
Leasing Companies and Mortgage Banks; all other lender types (Otherlend) are the left-
out group in our regressions
6. As additional proxies for firm risk, we include Tangibility, 
defined as the sum of inventory and property, plant and equipment, as a fraction of total 
assets, and R&D, an indicator variable for whether the firm has employees devoted to 
R&D activities. We control for the owner’s education using College, an indicator variable 
for whether the firm’s principal owner has completed a college education. In addition, 
Blanchflower, Levine and Zimmerman (1998) and Cavalluzo, Cavalluzo, and Wolken 
(2002) suggest that minorities are discriminated in credit markets. To  control for the 
effect of ethnical origin on loan maturity, we use Hispanic and Black, which are indicator 
variables  for  whether  at  least  half  of  the  firm  is  owned  by  Hispanics  or  African 
Americans.  Finally,  we  need  to  control  for  the  maturity  of  the  existing  debt,  as  the 
maturity structure of a firm’s total debt outstanding may affect the maturity of new loans. 
For this purpose we use two proxies: Avgmat and Stdebt. Avgmat is the weighted-average 
maturity of the borrower’s institutional debt calculated as the fraction of each type of debt 
(from the firm’s balance sheet) times its maturity in months. Because the SSBF does not 
contain data on the maturity of outstanding debt, we follow Scherr and Hulburt (2001) in 
assuming maturities of 6 months for lines of credit, 30 months for capital leases, 60 
months for mortgages,  and 18 months for motor vehicle loans, equipment loans, and 
                                                 
6 Otherlend includes other non-financial institutions, such as Venture Capital Firms or Small Business 
Investment Companies, other business firm, Family or Other Individuals, Small Business Administration, 
other government agencies, American Express, and Supplier Firms.   15
other miscellaneous loans. Our second variable, Stdebt is the percentage of a firm’s total 
debt that matures in less than a year, and includes accounts payable and current liabilities.  
In order to mitigate the impact of outliers in Relamount, Firmsize, Dta, and Roa, 
we winsorize these variables at the top/bottom 1% of the distribution. As in Berger and 
Udell (1995), an upper limit of 30 years was imposed on Firmage and Length, which 
assumes  that  no  additional  relevant  information  is  revealed  after  30  years.  Summary 
statistics of the variables employed in the analysis are reported in Table 4.  
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
The firms in the sample have median assets of $639.4 thousands, their median 
leverage is 0.58 and their median profit margin is 4.23%. Interestingly, 30% of the firms 
in the sample had been delinquent on either personal or business obligations. The median 
firm age is 12 years, while the median length of the relationship of firms with lenders of 
their last loan is 5 years. Only 29% of the firms borrow from more than one institution. 
On average the yield curve has been upward sloping during our sample period.  
 
3. The determinants of loan maturity 
3.1 Empirical approach 
Our basic empirical model is described in equation (1) below, and uses the natural 
logarithm of Maturity as the dependent variable,  
 
Ln(Maturity) =  0 +  1 Y +  2 X +  3 Loantype +  4 Loanuse + 5 Industry +  6 Year +    16
(1) 
where Y is a vector of other contract terms, X is a vector of predetermined variables, 
Loantype is a vector of six loan type dummies, Loanuse is a vector of  seven different 
loan use dummies, Industry is a vector of eight industry dummies, and Year is a vector of 
four year dummies (recall that loan applications where made during 1990-1994).  
One problem that arises in exploring the determinants of any loan contract term is 
that all loan contract features could be simultaneously determined. Thus, one problem in 
estimating  equation  (1)  is  that  the  vector  of  other  contract  terms,  Y,  is  potentially 
endogenous.  If  the  decision  on  maturity  is  simultaneous  to  the  decision  on  another 
contract feature, then not only the coefficients of the contract variables could be biased, 
but also the coefficients of all other explanatory variables
7. 
Rather than estimating an ad-hoc system with unclear exclusion restrictions or 
attempting to instrument the various elements contained in the vector Y, we address the 
problem as follows. First, we estimate reduced-form regressions of loan maturity on all 
the predetermined variables of the model, but excluding other contract terms, Y. The 
regression coefficients of X then reflect the effect of these variables on loan maturity, 
inclusive of any predicted maturity effect of the variables in Y that they may imply. While 
this econometric approach yields consistent estimates and goes a long way in exploring 
the effect of our key variables on loan maturity, it does not allow us to explore the effect 
of other contract terms on maturity, notably those that are expected to influence maturity 
by providing more control to lenders, such as collateral pledges and guarantees.  
Second, we estimate equation (1) under the assumption that contract terms are 
determined  sequentially,  with  decisions  about  the  contract  terms  in  Y  preceding  loan 
                                                 
7 This property can be shown easily using the results on partitioned regression in Greene (1997).   17
maturity determination. In such specification, the estimated coefficients on the vector X 
now reflect the effect of the predetermined variables on loan maturity excluding their 
effect through other contract terms. Previous work assumes a similar recursive model 
structure  to  analyze  the  determinants  of  borrowing  costs,  with  the  collateral  decision 
assumed  to  precede  the  interest  rate  decision  (Berger  and  Udell  (1995),  Harhoff  and 
Körting (1998), Elsas and Krahnen (1998), Degryse and Ongena (2004))
8. A perhaps 
strong case can be made that collateral and guarantees can be treated as exogenous in the 
loan  maturity  regressions.  Indeed,  collateral  is  often  pledged  at  the  beginning  of  a 
relationship, and is adjusted infrequently. However, given the lack of detailed data on this 
complex bargaining process, we make no conclusive statement about the exogeneity of 
other components of Y, but rather explore whether substantial bias is likely to be present. 
 
3.2 Results 
Previous  research  shows  that  the  effect  of  firm-creditor  relationships  on  loan 
arrangements  is  typically  stronger  for  lines  of  credit  (LCs),  because  they  represent  a 
commitment by the lender to provide future financing under prespecified conditions (e.g., 
Berger and Udell (1995) and Harhoff and Körting (1998)). Berger and Udell (1995, p. 
353) argue that LCs represent a formalization of the firm-creditor relationships and that 
LCs are more “relationship-driven” than other loans that are “transaction-driven”. Thus, 
our analysis distinguishes between lines of credit and other types of loans. 
                                                 
8 Berger and Udell (1995) also control for guarantees in their regressions of borrowing costs, and conclude 
that this introduces no significant bias. Degryse and Ongena (2004) treat loan size as exogenous in a similar 
regression using Belgian data, and argue that simultaneity does not bias their results.    18
Table 5 reports ordinary least squares (OLS) results of equation (1) for all loans, 
lines of credit, and other loans. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parenthesis 
below the estimates. All regressions include a constant term, year, industry and loan use 
dummy variables (not reported). In addition, regressions for all loans and other loans 
include loan type dummies (not reported). We first discuss our reduced-form results for 
the sample of all loans (column 1), lines of credit (column 3) and other loans (column 5). 
Our first interesting result concerns the effect of our inverse proxies for informational 
opacity. We find a positive and statistically significant effect of Firmsize on loan maturity 
across all loan types. We also find a positive effect of Firmage on loan maturity for lines 
of credit, but no effect for other loan types
9. Taken together, these results are consistent 
with  financial  intermediaries  lending  with  shorter  maturities  to  more  informationally 
opaque borrowers.  
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
We find no effect of our financial condition variables for the whole sample and 
for lines of credit. However, the coefficient on Roa is positive and statistically significant 
for  other  loans,  suggesting  that  better  financial  conditions  are  associated  with  longer 
maturities  for  these  other  loans.  Of  the  credit  history  variables,  the  coefficient  on 
Owdelinq is negative for all loan types, and statistically significant for lines of credits, but 
                                                 
9  The  coefficient  on  Firmage
2  is  negative  and  statistically  significant,  suggesting  a  concave  relation 
between firm age and loan maturity. However, the effect of firm age on loan maturity remains positive for 
all of the values in our sample.   19
not for other loans. This result suggests that lenders use shorter maturities to exert control 
over  borrowers  with  poor  personal  credit  histories.  None  of  the  other  credit  history 
variables are significant. One explanation is that when lending to small businesses, banks 
rely more on the use of hard information on the business owner’s record in paying off 
personal  debt,  rather  than  on  the  less  reliable  information  on  the  business  itself
10. 
Regarding  our  ownership/governance  variables,  we  find  a  statistically  significant  and 
negative  effect  of  Ownage  on  loan  maturity  across  all  loan  types,  and  positive  and 
significant coefficients of Ownshr and Exper for the sample of other loans. We interpret 
these  results  as  evidence  that  older,  less  experienced,  and  lower  ownership  primary 
owners are less able (or lack the incentive) to run a firm efficiently, or are less able to 
monitor  and  control  the  firm’s  manager,  thus  reducing  the  likelihood  of  generating 
sufficient funds to repay the loan
11.  
Contrary  to  our  expectations,  we  find  no  evidence  of  a  positive  association 
between stronger firm-creditor relationships and longer maturities. None of our measures 
of  the  strength  of  the  relationship  with  the  lender  (Length  and  Multiple)  have  a 
statistically significant effect on loan maturity, even if we restrict the analysis to lines of 
credit,  which  as  discussed  above,  are  likely  to  be  more  driven  by  relationships.  In 
                                                 
10 Lenders such as Wells Fargo are increasingly applying to small businesses the statistics-based methods 
long used to review consumer applications for credit cards and mortgages. They pinpoint a few pieces of 
hard information, mainly related to the owner’s personal record. 
11 An alternative interpretation of the coefficient on Ownage is that older owners are expected to retire 
sooner (or even die), forcing the lender to renegotiate with an unknown successor, thus making the loan 
riskier.  
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addition, the use of informationally intensive financial services at the lending institution 
is  not  associated  with  longer  maturities.  Moreover,  the  use  of  checking  accounts  is 
negatively related with the maturity of the loan obtained for other types of loans.  
All  of  the  results  from  the  reduced-form  regressions  remain  statistically 
significant and of the same sign and magnitude when the potentially endogenous contract 
terms are added to the regressions (columns 2, 4, and 6). This suggests that including the 
vector  Y  in  the  right-hand  side  of  equation  (1)  introduces  no  substantial  bias  on  the 
coefficient estimates of the variables in X. The most important results that arise from 
including the vector Y are related to collateral pledges and guarantees. For lines of credit, 
we find a strong and statistically significant association between collateral pledges and 
maturity,  but  no  effect  of  guarantees.  This  is  consistent  with  collateral  mitigating 
borrower risk-shifting incentives and lenders’ concern about the higher probability of 
default associated with longer maturities. One explanation for the lack of significance of 
guarantees  is  that  a  guarantee  is  a  weaker  claim  than  a  pledge  of  collateral,  since 
guarantees  do  not  involve  specific  liens  that  prevent  these  assets  from  being  sold  or 
consumed. For other loans we find a positive effect of collateral, but it is not statistically 
significant.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  most  loans  in  that  sub-sample  are  fully 
collateralized, and so the loan type dummies already capture the effect of collateral on 
maturity  (if  we  drop  these  dummies  Collateral  becomes  statistically  significant).  In 
addition, we find a positive effect of Relamount for all loan types and a negative effect of 
Fixedrate in the sample of other loans, but not for lines of credit. Given our previous 
discussion about endogeneity issues, we do not make any claim regarding causality here.    21
To summarize, our evidence supports the hypothesis that financial intermediaries 
use loan maturity to  address information problems when lending to small and  young 
firms.  While  the  results  are  consistent  with  lenders  shortening  maturities  to  more 
informationally  opaque,  risky  borrowers,  we  do  not  find  evidence  of  a  positive 
association between the strength or scope of firm-creditor relationships and loan maturity. 
 
3.3 Robustness checks 
We  conduct  two  robustness  checks.  First,  most  of  the  firm  financial 
characteristics correspond to 1992, while some of the loans where granted in 1990-1992. 
This  means  that  for  some  firms  in  our  sample  the  financial  data  that  we  use  in  our 
regressions as explanatory variables were not available at the time of the loan. Unless the 
firm’s financial condition was fairly stable, this could introduce biases. Of the 1,672 
loans  in  our  sample,  1,463  were  obtained  in  1993-1994.  We  repeated  our  regression 
analysis  focusing only  on loans made after 1993 and our results remain qualitatively 
unchanged.  
To explore whether our results on collateral pledges and guarantees could be due 
to biases introduced by other endogenous contract terms, we repeated our analysis after 
dropping all elements of Y, except for Collateral and Guarantor, which are more likely to 
be exogenous in our regressions than the other contract terms. Results are similar to those 
reported, and are available from the authors.  
 
4. Conclusions    22
We  use  the  1993  National  Survey  of  Small  Businesses  Finances  to  study  the 
determinants  of  loan  maturity.  We  hypothesize  that  financial  intermediaries  use  loan 
maturities to exert control over small, informationally opaque businesses, and base our 
tests on the assumption that longer maturities exacerbate the consequences of borrower-
lender  informational  asymmetries.  Our  hypothesis  implies  that  lenders  will  shorten 
maturities  to  more  informationally  opaque  and  risky  borrowers.  Thus,  we  predict  a 
positive  association  between  loan  maturity  and  informational  transparency,  better 
financial condition, and better credit history. We also explore the role of firm-creditor 
relationships in explaining loan maturity. If relationships generate valuable information 
for the lender and attenuate the problems arising from the informational opacity of small 
firms, then we expect that stronger and broader relationships should be associated with 
longer  term  lending.  In  addition,  to  the  extent  that  collateral  pledges  and  guarantees 
provide protection to the lender against borrower misbehavior, secured and guaranteed 
loans should have longer maturities. 
We find that both of our measures of borrower informational transparency, firm 
size and firm age, are associated with longer maturity loans. However, while the effect of 
firm size is statistically significant across all loan types, the effect of firm age is only 
significant for lines of credit. As expected, collateral pledges are associated with longer 
maturities for lines of credit, but we find no effect of guarantees. One explanation for this 
finding  is  that  collateral,  as  opposed  to  personal  guarantees,  involve  liens  to  specific 
assets, and thus give the lender better protection. We find that poor credit history by the 
firm owner is associated with shorter maturities for lines of credit, while better financial 
condition (measured by firm profitability) is related to longer maturities for other loan   23
types. In addition, we find that more experienced and younger firm owners are related to 
longer maturities. Contrary to our expectations, longer firm-creditor relationships, more 
concentrated borrowing, and the existence of checking, savings or other types of accounts 
with  the  lender  (scope  of  the  relationship)  are  not  associated  with  longer  maturities. 
While  the  evidence  in  the  literature  points  to  a  strong  effect  of  borrower-lender 
relationship on the access to credit, our results, together with the evidence summarized in 
the introduction, leads to conclude that the effect of relationship variables on contract 
characteristics is mixed, and therefore not conclusive.    24
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The sample consists of 1,672 loans to small businesses obtained from the National 
Survey of Small Businesses Finances 1993. 
     
  # Obs.  % of sample 
     
By Industry     
Mining  17  1.0 
Construction  196  11.7 
Manufacturing  283  16.9 
Transp., Comm. & Public Utilities  77  4.6 
Wholesale Trade  177  10.6 
Retail Trade   337  20.2 
Insurance & Real Estate  98  5.9 
Services  487  29.1 
     
By Organizational Form     
Sole Proprietorship  295  17.6 
Partnership  124  7.4 
S-Corporation  477  28.5 
C-Corporation  776  46.4 
     
By Type of Lender     
Bank
1  1,469  87.9 
Non-Bank
2  160  9.6 
Other
3  43  2.6 
     
By Year Applied     
1990  4  0.2 
1991  48  2.9 
1992  157  9.4 
1993  585  35.0 
1994  878  52.5 
     
Loan Use     
Working capital  909  54.4 
Motor Vehicles, Other Equipment/Machinery  373  22.3 
Leasehold Improvements, Land and 





Inventory accumulation  48  2.9 
Debt Relief or Refinancing  65  3.9 
Business Expansion, Acquisitions  44  2.6 
Other Uses 
4  15  0.9 
 
1 Includes credit unions, savings banks, savings & loans associations, and commercial banks. 
2 Includes finance companies, insurance companies, brokerage or mutual funds companies, leasing 
companies, and mortgage banks. 
3 Includes other non-financial institutions, such as VC firms of small business investment companies, other 
business firm, family or other individuals, SBA, other government agencies, American Express, and 
supplier firms. 









                       
    Maturity (months)  Collateral   Guarantor 
 
Median  





Type of Loan  # obs  Mean  Median  Min  Max  Stdev.  (%)  (%)  (%)  ($ 000s)  (%) 
Lines of Credit  997  23.2  12  1  240  29.0  62.1  59.4  8.0  200.0  28.3 
Capital Leases  40  54.3  60  12  240  41.3  100.0  57.5  8.9  42.5  80.0 
Mortgages  145  128.0  120  1  360  98.5  99.3  56.6  8.5  206.0  42.8 
Motor Vehicle  128  39.8  36  1  180  29.4  99.2  39.8  8.4  20.0  82.8 
Equipment  153  44.7  36  1  240  31.3  99.3  50.3  8.5  47.0  64.1 
Other Misc.  209  48.0  36  1  360  87.8  57.9  52.6  8.5  54.8  53.6 
                       
All Loans   1,672  39.4  12.0  1  360  52.9  71.9  55.9  8.0  100.0  41.4 
                         29
Table 3 
Variable Definition 
   
 
Loan Contract Terms  
Maturity  Length of the loan contract  (months) 
Collateral  = 1 if the loan was secured, zero otherwise 
Guarantor  = 1 if the loan was guaranteed, zero otherwise 
Interest  Interest paid (%) 
Relamount  Approved amount / Total assets 
Fixedrate  = 1 if the interest rate on the loan was fixed, zero otherwise 
 
Informational Opacity 
Firmsize   Total assets ($000s) 
Firmage
  Firm age (years)
 1 
   
Financial Condition 
Dta  Total debt / total assets 
Roa  Return on assets 
NWC  (Current assets-current liabilities)/total assets 
   
Firm and Owner Credit History 
Owdelinq  # of personal obligations the owner was delinquent 60 days or more during the last 3 years 
2 
Firmdelinq   # of business obligations the firm was delinquent 60 days or more during the last 3 years 
2 
Bankrupt  = 1 if the firm declared bankruptcy during the last 7 years, zero otherwise 
Judgment  = 1 if there are any judgments rendered against the firm owner, zero otherwise 
   
Ownership/Governance 
Ownmg   = 1 if the firm is managed by an owner, zero otherwise 
Ownshr   Ownership share of the firm’s principal owner (%) 
Family   = 1 if a single family owns at least 50% of the firm, zero otherwise 
Ownage  Age of the principal owner (years) 
Exper  Owner experience (years) 
Sole  =1 if the firm is constituted as a sole proprietorship, zero otherwise (omitted in regressions) 
Partner  =1 if the firm is constituted as a partnership, zero otherwise 
S-Corp  =1 if the firm is constituted as a subchapter S corporation, zero otherwise 
Corp  =1 if the firm is constituted as a C corporation, zero otherwise 
   
Relationship Variables 
Length
  Length of the relationship with lender (years)
1 
Multiple   = 1 if the firm borrows from more than one institution, zero otherwise 
Checking  = 1 if the firm has checking accounts with the lender, zero otherwise 
Savings  = 1 if the firm has savings accounts with the lender, zero otherwise 
Othfinserv  = 1 if the firm has other financial services with the lender, zero otherwise 
3 
   




Table 3 (Cont.) 
Variable Definition 
   
 
Other Control Variables 
Termstruct  Yield of a 10-year govt. bond minus yield of a 3-month T-Bill when loan was made 
Highconc  = 1 if the concentration of deposits in the lender’s area is high, zero otherwise 
Bank  =1 if the lender is a banking institution, zero otherwise 
4 
Nonbank  =1 if the lender is a non-bank financial institution, zero otherwise 
5 
Otherlend  =1 if the lender is a non financial institution, zero otherwise (omitted in regressions) 
6 
Tangibility  Sum of inventory, land, and depreciable assets / total assets 
R&D   = 1 if the firm has employees devoted to R&D, zero otherwise 
College  =1 if the principal owner has at least completed a college education, zero otherwise 
Hispan   = 1 if more that 50% of the firm is owned by Hispanics, zero otherwise 
Black  = 1 if more that 50% of the firm is owned by African Americans, zero otherwise 
Avgmat  Weighted-average maturity of the borrower’s institutional debt  
Stdebt  Accounts payable and current liabilities as fraction of total debt 
 
1 An upper limit of 30 years was imposed on Firmage and Length, which assumes that no additional relevant 
information is revealed after 30 years.  
2 The variable takes four values, 0, 1, 2, and 3 corresponding to zero, one, two and three or more delinquencies. 
3 Includes transaction, cash management, credit related, brokerage, or trust services. 
4 Includes credit unions, savings banks, savings & loans associations, and commercial banks. 
5 Includes finance companies, insurance companies, brokerage or mutual funds companies, leasing companies, and 
mortgage banks. 
6 Includes other non-financial institutions, such as VC firms of small business investment companies, other business 




   Mean   Median     Stdev. 
       
Loan Contract Terms        
Maturity  39.38  12.00  52.93 
Collateral  0.72     
Guarantor  0.56     
Interest  8.48  8.00  2.15 
Relamount  0.52  0.25  0.92 
Fixedrate  0.41     
       
Informational Opacity       
Firmsize  2,983.27  639.37  5,980.25 
Firmage  14.42  12.00  8.76 
       
Financial Condition       
Dta  0.66  0.58  0.49 
Roa  0.39  0.10  1.30 
NWC  -0.04  0.00  0.13 
       
Firm and Owner Credit History       
Owdelinq  0.09     
Firmdelinq   0.21     
Bankrupt  0.02     
Judgment  0.04     
       
Ownership/Governance       
Ownmg   0.77     
Ownshr   67.59  61.50  30.19 
Family   0.76     
Ownage  50.10  49.00  10.50 
Exper  20.56  20.00  10.67 
       
Relationship Variables       
Length  7.84  5.00  8.41 
Multiple   0.29     
Checking  0.72     
Savings  0.27     
Othfinserv  0.45     
       
Other Control Variables       
Termstruct  2.84  2.84  0.36 
Highconc  0.52     
Tangibility  0.59  0.62  0.27 
R&D  0.31     
College  0.60     
Hispan  0.05     
Black  0.05     
Avgmat  15.9  11.7  15.66 
Stdebt  0.40  0.33  0.33 




Multivariate Analysis of Loan Maturity  
                         
The dependent variable is Ln(maturity). All regressions include a constant term, year, industry, loan type, and loan use 
dummy variables (not reported). Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in parenthesis below the estimates. *, **, *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
                         
  All Loans  Lines of Credit  Other Loans 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)   
Loan Contract Terms 
Collateral      0.184  ***      0.173  ***      0.256   
      (3.54)        (3.39)        (1.57)   
Guarantor      0.034        -0.078        0.130   
      (0.75)        (1.52)        (1.55)   
Interest      -0.013        -0.014        -0.006   
      (1.14)        (0.92)        (0.35)   
Relamount      0.107  ***      0.072  **      0.155  *** 
      (4.41)        (2.35)        (3.79)   
Fixedrate      -0.161  ***      -0.040        -0.315  *** 
      (3.02)        (0.64)        (3.40)   
 
Informational Opacity 
Ln(Firmsize)  0.052  ***  0.049  ***  0.041  **  0.032  *  0.069  **  0.073  ** 
  (3.36)    (2.93)    (2.39)    (1.75)    (2.35)    (2.40)   
Firmage  0.017    0.016    0.039  ***  0.042  ***  -0.008    -0.010   
  (1.34)    (1.31)    (2.69)    (2.85)    (0.33)    (0.46)   
Firmage 
2  -0.000    -0.000    -0.001  **  -0.001  ***  0.000    0.000   
  (1.17)    (1.14)    (2.55)    (2.71)    (0.52)    (0.57)   
                  
Financial Condition                  
Dta  0.035    -0.031    -0.008    -0.048    0.092    -0.004   
  (0.68)    (0.59)    (0.12)    (0.71)    (1.08)    (0.05)   
Roa  0.014    0.004    -0.011    -0.020    0.064  **  0.055  * 
  (0.82)    (0.25)    (0.49)    (0.90)    (2.16)    (1.86)   
NWC  -0.208    -0.228    -0.101    -0.142    -0.359    -0.346   
  (1.13)    (1.24)    (0.50)    (0.72)    (0.98)    (0.93)   
                   
Firm and Owner Credit History                   
Owdelinq  -0.100  ***  -0.094  **  -0.105  **  -0.104  **  -0.097    -0.097   
  (2.61)    (2.53)    (2.53)    (2.51)    (1.58)    (1.65)   
Firmdelinq  0.021    0.019    0.040    0.035    -0.002    -0.004   
  (0.94)    (0.86)    (1.59)    (1.44)    (0.05)    (0.11)   
Bankrupt   0.102    0.067    0.198    0.206    0.090    0.052   
  (0.57)    (0.39)    (0.77)    (0.80)    (0.42)    (0.29)   
Judgment   0.021    0.006    0.050    0.049    0.016    -0.036   
  (0.16)    (0.05)    (0.37)    (0.36)    (0.07)    (0.16)   






Table 5 (Cont.) 
Multivariate Analysis of Loan Maturity  
                         
  All Loans  Lines of Credit  Other Loans 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)   
Ownership/Governance                    
Ownmg  0.025    0.019    0.070    0.079    -0.032    -0.045   
  (0.51)    (0.39)    (1.36)    (1.52)    (0.31)    (0.46)   
Ownshr  0.001    0.001    -0.001    -0.001    0.003  *  0.004  ** 
  (0.66)    (0.93)    (1.45)    (1.18)    (1.90)    (2.23)   
Family  -0.001    0.007    0.002    0.011    0.024    0.005   
  (0.01)    (0.13)    (0.03)    (0.18)    (0.22)    (0.04)   
Ownage  -0.051  ***  -0.054  ***  -0.050  **  -0.052  **  -0.080  **  -0.089  *** 
  (2.67)    (2.86)    (2.34)    (2.41)    (2.34)    (2.71)   
Ownage 
2  0.000  **  0.001  ***  0.000  *  0.000  *  0.001  **  0.001  *** 
  (2.48)    (2.69)    (1.88)    (1.95)    (2.46)    (2.86)   
Exper  0.018  *  0.017  *  0.012    0.012    0.030  **  0.030  ** 
  (1.92)    (1.89)    (1.11)    (1.05)    (2.01)    (2.09)   
Exper 
2  -0.000  *  -0.000  *  -0.000    -0.000    -0.001  **  -0.001  ** 
  (1.65)    (1.67)    (0.35)    (0.30)    (2.39)    (2.48)   
Partner  -0.065    -0.050    -0.195    -0.124    0.109    0.095   
  (0.54)    (0.42)    (1.22)    (0.80)    (0.59)    (0.54)   
S-Corp  0.032    0.016    -0.105    -0.066    0.168    0.109   
  (0.39)    (0.20)    (0.99)    (0.63)    (1.35)    (0.90)   
C-Corp  -0.069    -0.091    -0.169    -0.142    0.016    -0.043   
  (0.86)    (1.14)    (1.64)    (1.38)    (0.13)    (0.35)   
 
Relationship Variables 
Length  -0.012    -0.008    -0.014    -0.011    -0.003    0.006   
  (1.18)    (0.77)    (1.13)    (0.95)    (0.15)    (0.33)   
Length 
2  0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    -0.000    -0.000   
  (0.44)    (0.12)    (0.56)    (0.44)    (0.27)    (0.70)   
Multiple  0.011    0.004    -0.011    -0.015    0.019    0.018   
  (0.22)    (0.09)    (0.20)    (0.27)    (0.23)    (0.21)   
Checking  -0.126    -0.111    -0.042    -0.016    -0.285  **  -0.251  ** 
  (1.62)    (1.46)    (0.42)    (0.16)    (2.28)    (2.07)   
Savings  -0.004    0.014    0.006    0.027    -0.039    0.002   
  (0.09)    (0.29)    (0.12)    (0.52)    (0.36)    (0.02)   
Otherfinserv  -0.038    -0.064    -0.097  *  -0.117  **  0.136    0.098   
  (0.70)    (1.20)    (1.66)    (1.99)    (1.22)    (0.91)   







Table 5 (Cont.) 
Multivariate Analysis of Loan Maturity  
                         
  All Loans  Lines of Credit  Other Loans 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)   
Other Control Variables 
Termstruct  0.122    0.122    0.034    0.040    0.167    0.143   
  (1.49)    (1.52)    (0.36)    (0.42)    (1.14)    (1.00)   
Highconc  -0.028    -0.017    -0.009    -0.006    -0.015    0.026   
  (0.63)    (0.40)    (0.19)    (0.12)    (0.18)    (0.32)   
Bank  0.168    0.078    0.527  *  0.430    0.038    -0.065   
  (0.90)    (0.42)    (1.83)    (1.49)    (0.17)    (0.29)   
Nonbank  0.291    0.233    0.679  **  0.564  *  0.117    0.134   
  (1.59)    (1.28)    (2.30)    (1.90)    (0.54)    (0.61)   
Tangibility  0.077    0.089    -0.041    -0.051    0.168    0.204   
  (0.87)    (1.01)    (0.37)    (0.47)    (1.13)    (1.39)   
R&D  -0.008    -0.007    -0.024    -0.024    0.012    0.018   
  (0.17)    (0.14)    (0.44)    (0.43)    (0.12)    (0.19)   
College  0.015    0.006    0.000    -0.001    0.027    0.007   
  (0.31)    (0.13)    (0.01)    (0.03)    (0.30)    (0.08)   
Hispanic  0.150    0.163    0.266  **  0.269  **  -0.019    0.010   
  (1.38)    (1.51)    (2.50)    (2.55)    (0.10)    (0.06)   
Black  0.154    0.140    0.101    0.072    0.124    0.121   
  (1.36)    (1.28)    (0.72)    (0.52)    (0.62)    (0.62)   
Avgmat  0.001    0.002    0.007  ***  0.008  ***  -0.004    -0.004   
  (0.75)    (1.11)    (3.46)    (3.94)    (1.62)    (1.50)   
Stdebt  -0.075    -0.083    0.038    0.030    -0.236    -0.283  * 
  (0.88)    (0.98)    (0.41)    (0.32)    (1.54)    (1.90)   
                         
R
2  0.37    0.39    0.25    0.27    0.34    0.38   
Obs.  1,672    1,672    997    997    675    675   
                         
 